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SUCCESSOR LIABILITY UNDER ECRA J
The New Jersey legislature enacted ECRA to clarify the extent of
liability for successor landowners of hazardous waste sites.' To a great
extent ECRA accomplishes this purpose by requiring the transferor to
clean up the site before the transfer, thus negating the possibility of
successoi liability. Nevertheless, specific provisions of ECRA fail to
govern some predecessor-successor liability disputes. Thus, in some in-
stances successor landowners of innocently acquired property may be
liable for cleanup costs under ECRA. This result conflicts with the
intent of the legislature in its enactment of ECRA2 and is potentially
unconstitutional as an inequitable oppression of landowners.'
ECRA clarifies the issue of successor liability. Under its provisions,
1. Note, The Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act (ECRA): New Accountabil-
ity For Industrial Landowners in New Jersey, 8 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 331, 332 (1985)
(ECRA was enacted to avoid predecessor-successor disputes that delayed cleanup)
[hereinafter Note, New Accountability]. Note, Successor Landowner Liability for Envi-
ronmental Torts: Robbing Peter to Pay Paul?, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 329, 349 (1982) (ECRA
seeks to "prospectively avoid the successor landowner liability issue").
New Jersey's attempt to clarify the limits of successor landowner liability is both a
commendable and noteworthy legislative goal. In this era of increasing ecological
awareness and societal demands for environmental responsibility, other states are fol-
lowing New Jersey's lead by enacting statutes similar to ECRA. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 22a-134aa-134o (West 1985) (Connecticut state statute governing trans-
fer of hazardous waste establishments). See also Gov. Cuomo To Propose Legislation to
Require Cleanups When Property Is Sold, 1 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA), Jan. 21, 1987, at
902.
2. See Note, New Accountability, supra note 1, at 339. (New Jersey legislature ap-
parently ignored the issue of predecessor liability).
The issue turns on whether ECRA is a "site-specific" or "activity-specific" regulatory
law. See Note, New Jersey's Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act: An Innovative
Approach to Environmental Regulation, 90 DICK. L. REv. 159, 191 (1985) [hereinafter
Note, An Innovative Approach] (ECRA as written appears to be an activity-specific law).
3. The New Jersey legislature enacted ECRA pursuant to New Jersey's state police
power. The constitutional limits of the police power include the requirement that the
means of regulation be reasonable and necessary for the public interest "and not unduly
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the original contaminators must bear cleanup costs.4 By requiring
cleanup by predecessor landowners, New Jersey may completely avoid
the issue of successor liability. In the alternative, ECRA allows trans-
ferees to accept responsibility for cleanup.' In such cases, the question
of successor liability is easily decided. This section of the symposium
addresses those instances where successor liability is an unsettled issue.
Problems arise when a transfer of land falls outside of specific ECRA
provisions. For example, suppose landowner A sells property to B
before ECRA's passage. B is not aware that the property contains
stored toxic waste. After ECRA's enactment, transferor A becomes
bankrupt or insolvent. Transferee B prepares to sell to C; however,
ECRA requires either a negative declaration6 or a cleanup plan before
oppressive." Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894). ECRA may be unconstitu-
tionally oppressive if NJDEP forces nonculpable property owners to pay cleanup costs.
See also New Jersey ECRA Law Is Flawed, Should Not Be Used As Model, Attorney
Says, 1 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA), Nov. 12, 1986, at 654. (ECRA is vague and overbroad
and NJDEP has administered ECRA in an overly inclusive manner).
4. ECRA states that "[t]he cleanup plan and detoxification of the site shall be im-
plemented by the owner or operator, provided that the purchaser, transferee, mortgagee
or other party to the transfer may assume that responsibility pursuant to the provisions
of this act. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-9(3)(c) (West Supp. 1988). The "owner or opera-
tor" of each "industrial establishment" is responsible for cleanup. An "industrial estab-
lishment" is any place engaged in the generation or storage of hazardous waste. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-8(f) (West Supp. 1988).
5. Transfer of industrial establishment: contingent on implementation of act: deferral
of cleanup plan
a. The provisions of any law or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding the
transferring of an industrial establishment is contingent on the implementation of
the provisions of this act.
b. If the premises of the industrial establishment would be subject to substantially
the same use by the purchaser, transferee, mortgagee or other party to the transfer,
the implementation of a cleanup plan and the detoxification of the site may be
deferred until the use changes or until the purchaser, transferee, mortgagee or
other party to the transfer closes, terminates or transfers operations.
(1) Within 60 days of receiving notice of the sale or realty transfer and the certifi-
cation that the industrial establishment would be subject to substantially the same
use, the department shall approve, conditionally approve, or deny the certification.
(2) Upon approval of the certification, the implementation of a cleanup plan and
detoxification of the site shall be deferred.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-11 (West Supp. 1988).
6. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 26B-1.3 (1987) defines a "negative declaration" as:
affidavit approved by the Department which is executed by an authorized officer or
management official of the industrial establishment stating that there has been no
discharge of hazardous substances and wastes on or from the industrial establish-
ment, or that any such discharge on or from the industrial establishment has been
cleaned up in accordance with procedures approved by the Department, and that
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every transfer.7 Preparing for its negative declaration, B discovers the
waste, which at any time may begin to leak and pose a health hazard.
Must B pay for cleanup of A's toxic waste?
Prior to enactment of ECRA, the answer would certainly have been
no. State of New Jersey v. Exxon' and State Department of Environ-
there remain no hazardous substances and wastes at the industrial establishment
except those that, upon written Department approval, will remain as part of the
normal industrial or commercial operation pursuant to any written agreements,




Owner or operator of industrial establishment planning to close or sell or transfer
operations; duties; implementation of cleanup plan
a. the owner or operator of an industrial establishment planning to close opera-
tions shall:
(1) Notify the department in writing, no more than five days subsequent to public
release, of its decision to close operations;
(2) Upon closing operations, or 60 days subsequent to public release of its decision
to close or transfer operations, whichever is later, the owner or operator shall sub-
mit a negative declaration or a copy of a cleanup plan to the department for ap-
proval and a surety bond or other financial security for approval by the department
guaranteeing performance of the cleanup in an amount equal to the cost estimate
for the cleanup plan.
b. The owner or operator of an industrial establishment planning to sell or trans-
fer operations shall:
(1) Notify the department in writing within five days of the execution of an agree-
ment of sale or any option to purchase;
(2) Submit within 60 days to transfer of title a negative declaration to the depart-
ment for approval, or within 60 days prior to transfer of title, attach a copy of any
cleanup plan to the contract or agreement or sale or any option to purchase which
may be entered into with respect to the transfer of operations. In the event that
any sale or transfer agreements or options have been executed prior to the submis-
sion of the plan to the department, the cleanup plan shall be transmitted, by certi-
fied mail, prior to the transfer of operations, to all parties to any transaction
concerning the transfer of operations, including purchasers, bankruptcy trustees,
mortgagees, sureties, and financiers;
(3) Obtain, upon approval of the cleanup plan by the department, a surety bond or
other financial security approved by the department guaranteeing performance of
the cleanup plan in an amount equal to the cost estimate for the cleanup plan.
c. The cleanup plan and detoxification of the site shall be implemented by the
owner or operator, provided that the purchaser, transferee, mortgagee or other
party to the transfer, may assume that responsibility pursuant to the provisions of
this act.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-9 (West Supp. 1987).
7. For a description of the general requirements of a cleanup plan, see N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 13.1K-8(a) (West Supp. 1988).
8. 151 N.J. Super. 464, 376 A.2d 1339 (Ch. Div. 1977). Under a statutory predeces-
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mental Protection v. Ventron9 established the principle that successor
landowners were not liable for cleanup unless they contributed to or
condoned the presence of toxic waste.'0 After ECRA's enactment, B's
status should remain the same. Section 13:1K-16 of ECRA provides
that successor landowner B will not be liable if B promptly reports
newly discovered toxic waste.1
sor to New Jersey's Spill Compensation and Control Act, the New Jersey Department
of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) sued ICI America, Inc., seeking to hold ICI
liable for oil refinery pollution on its land. The previous landowner was responsible for
the pollution. The court held that simple ownership of land was insufficient to impose
liability in the absence of affirmative acts by the successor. The court indicated that
Exxon, the original owner and a third party to the suit, was the party that should be
liable. Id. at 464, 376 A.2d at 1243. The court dismissed NJDEP's complaint against
ICI America, Inc.
9. 94 N.J. 473, 463 A.2d 893 (1983). In Ventron, NJDEP brought an action under
the state's Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11a to -
23.1lz (West Supp. 1988). The Supreme Court of New Jersey found the corporate de-
fendants liable for cleanup of mercury pollution in Berry's Creek, an estuary of the
Hackensack River. 94 N.J. at 483, 463 A.2d at 898. Defendants Robert and Rita Wolf
were innocent purchasers of part of the property from Ventron Corporation. The Wolfs
were not responsible for the presence of the mercury and therefore the court held the
Wolfs were not liable. Id. at 493, 463 A.2d at 903.
10. Exxon, 151 N.J. Super. at 471, 376 A.2d at 1344 (liability is not imposed when
defendant did not contribute to waste on the property and did not encourage or permit
the accumulation of waste); Ventron, 94 N.J. at 493, 463 A.2d at 908 (construing the
Spill Act, defendants are liable if they are "in any way responsible" for toxic waste).
11. Industrial establishment; owners' or operators' inspections and reporting require-
ment; violations penalty; injunctions; liability of reporter
a. An owner or operator of an industrial establishment, or real property which
once was the site of an industrial establishment, who knows or suspects the occur-
rence of any hazardous discharge on-site, above or below ground, at the industrial
establishment or real property shall, within 10 days of obtaining any information
leading to this knowledge or suspicion, make an inspection thereof and file a writ-
ten report concerning this hazardous discharge with the governing body of the
municipality in which the industrial establishment or real property is located and
the local board of health. The report shall include: the types and quantity of haz-
ardous substances involved in the hazardous discharge, if known; the location of
the hazardous discharge; and any actions taken by the owner or operator of the
industrial establishment to contain the hazardous substance.
b. A person who fails to make a report required pursuant to this section, know-
ingly gives or causes to be given any false information in any such report, or other-
wise violates the provisions of this section, or any rule or regulation adopted
pursuant thereto, is liable to a penalty of not more than $50,000.00, to be collected
in a summary proceeding under "the penalty enforcement law," N.J.S. 2A:58-1 et.
seq., or in a court of competent jurisdiction wherein injunctive relief has been re-
quested. The Superior Court shall have jurisdiction to enforce "the penalty en-
forcement law." If the violation is of a continuing nature, each day during which it
continues shall constitute an additional, separate and distinct offense.
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The actual application of ECRA, however, makes the answer less
clear. Under ECRA, the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection (NJDEP) has authority to implement cleanups.12 NJDEP
reads ECRA's provisions to apply solely on the basis of ownership,
regardless of the present owner's contribution to the condition of the
hazardous waste site.'3 Such a literal interpretation conflicts with the
pre-ECRA holding in Exxon 14 and imposes an oppressive burden on
innocent purchasers. 5 A more equitable solution would be to inter-
pret ECRA so that NJDEP does not impose liability solely on the basis
of ownership. If courts follow the Exxon holding,16 successor land-
c. If any person violates any of the provisions of this section, the Department of
Environmental Protection, the governing body of the municipality or the local
health department may institute a civil action in the Superior Court for injunctive
relief to prohibit and prevent the continuation of the violation and the court may
proceed in a summary manner.
d. Any person reporting a hazardous discharge pursuant to the provisions of this
section shall not, by this report, incur liability for the cleanup of the hazardous
discharge. The provisions of this subsection shall not affect a person's liability for
the cleanup of a hazardous discharge under any other law, rule, or regulation.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-16 (West Supp. 1987).
12. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:lK-10, 13:1K-18 (West Supp. 1988) (promulgation of
rules and regulations by NJDEP). See generally New Jersey Said To Be On "Cutting
Edge" In Requiring Waste Cleanup Before Land Sales, 1 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA), Aug.
20, 1986, at 297 (discussion of NJDEP's administration of ECRA).
13. See, eg., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-7 (West Supp. 1988) (the transfer of real
property); id. at § 13:IK-8(f) (any place ... engaged in... hazardous substances...
on-site); id. at § 13.lK-8(g) (on the site); id. at § 13:1K-11(c) (site cleanup).
There are other bare references to property or owner, without qualification as to re-
sponsibility. The legislative history of ECRA refers to the sale of "certain properties
associated with hazardous waste," and refers to "owners" of "property which was once
the site of an industrial establishment." SENATE ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT COM-
MITTEE STATEMENT, ASSEMBLY No. 1231 - L.1983 c. 330, reprinted in N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 13:1K-6 (West Supp. 1987). Such references are conducive to misinterpretation
of ECRA. See infra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
14. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
15. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
16. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
Under N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 26B-7 (1987) the NJDEP may issue an Adminis-
trative Consent Order (ACO) which will allow a transferor to transfer property prior to
submission of a negative declaration or cleanup plan. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 26B-7
(1987) lists nine possible criteria under which a landowner may qualify for an ACO,
including the possibility of impending bankruptcy if NJDEP does not issue an ACO.
This article takes the position that there should be one more situation in which the
NJDEP allows transfers under an ACO or similar dispensation: where the original
contaminator is insolvent and the innocent current landowner is burdened with all
cleanup costs. See infra note 18.
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owners would not be liable for cleaning up hazardous waste for which
they are not responsible.
The NJDEP interprets ECRA to overrule the Exxon holding.17 In
its commendable task of forcing cleanup, the NJDEP overzealously at-
tempts to apply ECRA solely on the basis of ownership. According to
NJDEP, hypothetical landowner B should have to pay for cleanup
before it can transfer to C. B then has a separate cause of action
against A for reimbursement. 18 The result is that innocent purchaser B
17. 16 N.J. Reg. No. 25, at 526. NJDEP stated its position as follows:
Several commenters expressed concern that actions of past owners or neighbors
could cause the environmental problems resulting in ECRA cleanup under the
Regulations. NJDEP intends to utilize the Regulation as a site specific environ-
mental problem tool. Subsequent legal actions may be necessary by the owner or
operator of an industrial establishment to determine and distribute responsibility
among other parties.
Id.
See also Note, An Innovative Approach, supra note 2, at 191 ("Current owners are held
liable by the Act but can pursue private legal actions against the transferor or generator
of the waste.").
18. 16 N.J. Reg. No. 25, at 526.
The New Jersey Superior Court recently accepted this interpretation of the statute in
Superior Air Prods. Co. v. NL Indus., Inc., 216 N.J. Super. 46, 522 A.2d 1025 (App.
Div. 1987). The NJDEP required Superior Air Products to clean up a site under
ECRA provisions. Superior did not comply, and instead sued the former owner, NL
Industries, to force NL Industries to conduct the cleanup. The court held that Superior
could neither sue NL Industries directly to force cleanup nor require the NJDEP to sue
NL Industries. Id. at 64, 522 A.2d at 1035.
The court agreed with NJDEP's view of ECRA. The property owner must conduct
its own cleanup before transfer. The property owner may then file a separate action
against former owners to resolve responsibility for the hazardous waste. Id. at 64, 522
A.2d at 1035.
The court decided that actual responsibility for the contamination does not affect
liability for cleanups ordered by NJIDEP under the auspices of ECRA; otherwise,
cleanup would be delayed while former and present owners litigated the question of
liability for cleanup. Id. The court stated that New Jersey enacted ECRA to avoid
problems such as the situation in State Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron, 94 N.J.
473, 463 A.2d 893 (1983) where cleanup was delayed for seven years while private par-
ties litigated the issue of liability for cleanup. 216 N.J. Super. at 62, 522 A.2d at 1034.
The court recognized that "as a result of the ECRA proceedings... plaintiff may be
required to expend substantial sums of money." Id. at 65, 522 A.2d at 1036. The court
apparently believed that Superior Air Products would be reimbursed due to its suit
against NL Industries. The court's rationale thus did not cover a similar fact situation
in which the prior owner, unlike NL Industries, would be insolvent. In such a case, the
court's rationale would place all the unreimbursed cleanup costs on an innocent party.
In such a situation, it would be more equitable for NJDEP to allow the transfer of
property to take place without enforcement of ECRA. NJDEP would then disburse
public funds for the cleanup.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-11(c) (West Supp. 1988) (no provision of ECRA is to
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is subjected to two lawsuits. 9
Until the NJDEP adopts a more equitable legislative interpretation,
some innocent purchasers will be held liable under ECRA. New inves-
tors will avoid the New Jersey market if they face potential liability for
the cleanup of waste which they did not produce. As applied by the
NJDEP, the statute could be an unconstitutionally 20 oppressive impo-
sition of liability in excess of the state police power.21
In the original hypothetical, B purchases property before the enact-
ment of ECRA. Successor liability problems persist, however, after
ECRA's enactment. For example, suppose landowner A sells to B, and
B produces toxic waste on the property. Due to unforeseen business
troubles, B cannot make payments on the property, and mortgagee C
takes ownership. Is C liable for cleanup? The NJDEP would argue
that C is directly liable on the basis of ownership. Mortgagee C would
then have a separate cause of action against B to recover the amount of
its liability.22
Alternatively, suppose landowner A falsifies information to obtain a
negative declaration that the site is waste free.23 A then sells the prop-
erty to B. If B wishes to sell to C, must B first pay all costs of cleanup
be "construed to limit, restrict, or prohibit the department from directing site cleanup
under any other statute, rule or regulation").
19. The NJDEP will file action against the successor who will then have to file
against the predecessor or be left with the entire burden of cleanup. Id. See supra note
3.
20. See supra note 3.
21. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. In the hypothetical, B would pay
cleanup costs, but B could not collect these cleanup costs from A. The state has
"taken" cleanup costs from B to pay for removal of A's waste. The state, therefore,
should bear this responsibility.
Federal law concerning toxic waste cleanup avoids this constitutional infirmity. See
42 U.S.C. § 6934(b) (1983) (liability may be imposed on previous owners and opera-
tors).
Some states provide a similar defense in their Superfund statutes. See MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 115B.03(l)(c) (1987); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 144.442(9)(b)(2) (1987); Ky. REv.
STAT. § 224.857 (1982). See generally Dean, How State Hazardous Waste Statutes In-
fluence Real Estate Transactions, 2 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA), Aug. 19, 1987, at 352.
22. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. NJDEP will also impose liability
on innocent purchasers in the context of hostile takeovers. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7,
§ 7:26B-1.7 (1987) There is no abuse of the police power in this context, however,
because the purchaser willingly accepts all assets and debts of the target. Such is not the
case with the ordinary innocent purchaser of contaminated property.
23. See supra note 6 for definition of negative declaration. In the past, the NJDEP
had not required an on-site inspection to ensure the integrity of each negative declara-
tion. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § § 7:1-3.8(a), 7:1-3.11(c) (1987). Newer regula-
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and then sue A separately? The NJDEP would say yes.24 In all three
hypotheticals, innocent transferees must sue contaminators to enforce
ECRA. Furthermore, it is possible that A will be out of business or
insolvent before the successor can discover the waste and recover
against A.
Thus, the burden of cleanup will in some instances fall upon inno-
cent transferees who will never gain reimbursement. Even if the suc-
cessor does recover from the transferor, he must finance the cleanup
costs and pay unexpected legal fees.25 Arguably, the NJDEP should
bear these costs. As a result, the NJDEP policy of liability based solely
on ownership occasionally shifts the costs of enforcing ECRA from the
public to the private sector.26
ECRA provisions, however, indicate that the legislature did not in-
tend to impose successor liability on innocent transferees. The use of
the term "owner or operator"27 consistently refers to the owner or op-
erator of an "industrial establishment."28 ECRA defines "industrial
tions will require a NJDEP inspection before the NJDEP approves any negative
declaration. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 7:26B-5.1 (1987).
24. A literal reading of ECRA would also cause problems in condemnation situa-
tions. After property is condemned or foreclosed, the state could require the owner to
pay for cleanup under ECRA. Combining such an additional burden with the taking
raises due process questions. Clearly, there are problems with literally interpreting
ECRA in every case. See generally Note, New Accountability, supra note 1, at 347. See
also Hogan, ECRA: An Update, 114 N.J.L.J. 529, 544 (1984) (NJDEP has taken an
inconsistent approach to condemnation cases).
25. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text. In State Dep't of Envtl. Protec-
tion v. Ventron, 94 N.J. 473, 463 A.2d 893 (1983) all the litigants were ordered to pay
the costs of their own legal fees. This ruling included the innocent purchasers. Id. at
504, 463 A.2d at 909.
Landowners are not allowed to reduce the property tax assessment by the amount of
the cost of cleanup. Inmar Associates, Inc. v. Carlstadt, 214 N.J. Super. 256, 518 A.2d
1110 (App. Div. 1986).
26. New Jersey ECRA Law Is Flawed, Should Not Be Used As Model, Attorney Says,
I Toxics L. Rep. (BNA), Nov. 12, 1986, at 654. (ECRA is responsible for cleanup by
private owners at a minimal cost to the state).
27. The term "owner or operator" is not defined in the Act. The NJDEP recently
attempted to clarify this ambiguity. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 7:26B-1.3 (1987) de-
fines "owner" as "any person who owns the real property of an industrial establishment
or who owns the industrial establishment." Id. This definition reflects NJDEP's inter-
pretation of ECRA. The definition of "owner" should include an exception for innocent
transferees.
28. The terms are used in conjunction in §§ 13:lK-9, 13:1K-16. In N.J. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 7, §§ 7:1-3.11, 7:1-3.12 (1987), NJDEP uses the two phrases interchangeably.
Reference is made to correspondence between the NJDEP and the industrial establish-
ment, rather than the "owner or operator" of the industrial establishment.
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establishment" so that only those responsible for the presence of the
toxic waste are liable for costs of cleanup.2 9
Another indication of legislative intent is the inclusion of section
13:1K-16, which allows transferees to avoid liability if they report
newly discovered hazardous waste.30 The overall purpose of the new
statute is to impose liability on the parties responsible for the presence
of waste, thus negating all successor liability.31 This purpose suggests
that NJDEP's interpretation of ECRA is incorrect.32
The NJDEP's position is incorrect because: (1) it inequitably im-
poses cleanup costs on innocent successor landowners; (2) it deters in-
vestors from locating in the jurisdiction; (3) it ignores the legislature's
intent to avoid successor liability; and (4) it allows for a potentially
unconstitutional abuse of the police power by imposing successor lia-
bility on innocent transferees.
A better rule would conform to the Exxon holding by prohibiting
the imposition of liability upon innocent transferees.33 Acceptance of
this rule would fulfill the main purpose of ECRA by avoiding the issue
29. "Industrial establishment" is defined in § 13:1K-8(f) and § 13:lK-15(c). An
industrial establishment must be "engaged in" the "generation, manufacture, refining,
transportation, treatment, storage, handling, or disposal of hazardous substances ....
Id.
That the party must be "engaged in" the listed activities shows that liability is to be
imposed on the contaminators, not innocent purchasers. The term "engaged in" implies
knowing action and can only be defined in terms of affirmative acts. If a party has taken
no action to contribute to the waste's presence, then the party should not be liable.
See Note, An Innovative Approach, supra note 2, at 191. (ECRA appears to be activ-
ity-specific, not site-specific). For further support of this argument, see N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 13:1K-13 (West Supp. 1988) (failure of transferor to comply with ECRA allows
transferee to void transfer and hold transferor liable for all cleanup costs).
30. The exemption provision in § 13:1K-16(d) is directly contrary to the site-spe-
cific position taken in NJDEP administration of ECRA regulations, and also seems to
contradict the court's opinion in Superior Air Prods. Co. v. NL Indus., Inc., 216 N.J.
Super. 46, 63, 522 A.2d 1025, 1035 (App. Div. 1987) (ECRA imposes strict liability
before every transfer). See supra notes 18-19.
31. See supra note 1.
32. In support of its position, NJDEP would advance a literal reading of ECRA's
provisions and the social policy goal of guaranteed decontamination before future trans-
fers. These are admirable arguments that support enforcement of a commendable envi-
ronmental statute such as ECRA. They do not withstand close analysis, however, in
those situations where NJDEP enforces ECRA against an innocent transferee who will
have no recourse against an insolvent transferor. In those instances, the NJDEP should
pay for cleanup using public funds.
33. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
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of successor liability altogether, either through predecessor cleanup 4
or through section 13:1K-16 release.35
If it is effectively enforced, ECRA will usually resolve the issues of
cleanup and successor liability. Courts would apply the Exxon doctrine
only if both an innocent transferee and an insolvent transferor are in-
volved.36 In these infrequent cases, the court will impose cleanup costs
either on the state or on the transferee. The equitable solution is to
require the state to fund the cleanup, rather than to force a large, unex-
pected expense on the innocent transferee.3 7 Society as a whole will
benefit from cleanup. In addition, the state can absorb the loss more
easily than an individual business person. The NJDEP's adoption of
this position will not undermine its ability to administer ECRA
effectively.
Horton J Lance*
34. See supra note 1. If land purchasers utilize ECRA and if the NJDEP accurately
interprets ECRA, land purchasers can actually benefit by limiting their future liability
through strict compliance with ECRA. See Businesses Urged To Increase Efforts To
Analyze Impact of Laws, Regulations, 2 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA), June 10, 1987, at 57.
35. See supra note 11.
36. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. If the transferee is not "innocent,"
the transferee is liable under ECRA for contributing to the waste or willingly taking the
land with knowledge of the waste's presence. See United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp.
1055, 1073 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982) (purchaser held liable after
buying site of toxic landfill). If the transferor is not "insolvent," NJDEP should pursue
the transferor or its successor in interest. Only if an innocent transferee purchases from
an insolvent transferor will the state bear the burden of cleanup cost under the correct
interpretation of ECRA.
37. The state can more easily accept the burden of the cleanup cost. Funds can be
raised through measures not available to private parties, such as levies on hazardous
waste industries, corporate surtaxes, and sale of state bonds. For an example see $L 65
Billion Waste Cleanup Plan Reflected In New Jersey Legislation Awaiting Signature, 1
Toxics L. Rep. (BNA), Nov. 5, 1986, at 619. (New Jersey funds for cleanup raised
through federal, state and corporate sources).
* J.D. 1988, Washington University.
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